Reasoning with model-based representations is an intuitive paradigm, which has been shown to be theoretically sound and to possess some computational advantages over reasoning with formula-based representations of knowledge. In this paper we present more evidence to the value of such representations. Our results hinge on the notion of relevance, and model based representations are shown to be useful in capturing relevant information, and in allowing to ignore irrelevant information. In particular, we consider situations where context-speci c information is used in the process of reasoning. We show that reasoning with model-based representations can be done e ciently in the presence of varying context information. We then consider the task of default reasoning. We show that default reasoning is a generalization of reasoning within context, in which the reasoner has many \context" rules, which may be con icting. We develop model-based algorithms that handle e ciently fragments of Reiter's default logic. Our intuition about relevance is best captured in the model for reasoning within context, where model-based representations enable us to lter out irrelevant information. Interestingly, default logic is somewhat in contrast with our intuition about relevance. Default rules do not tell us explicitly what the context information is. Instead, we have to gure out what are the possible \extensions" and then use those as possible contexts. As we show, model-based representations capture all possible extensions in an accessible form, thereby supporting e cient default reasoning whenever possible. Lastly, we argue that these results support an incremental view of reasoning in a natural way. We discuss the Learning to Reason framework, which emphasizes this view, and the notion of relevance as manifested in it. In particular, we discuss results on Learning to Reason in which model-based representations are used to represent relevant knowledge.
Introduction
The generally accepted framework for studying reasoning in intelligent systems is the knowledgebased system approach. The idea is to store the knowledge in some representation language with a well de ned meaning assigned to its sentences. The sentences are stored in a Knowledge Base (KB) which is combined with a reasoning mechanism that is used to determine what can be inferred from the sentences in the KB. Various knowledge representations can be used to represent the knowledge in a knowledge-based system. Di erent representation systems (e.g., a set of logical rules, a probabilistic network) are associated with corresponding reasoning mechanisms, each with its own merits and range of applications. Given a logical knowledge base, for example, reasoning can be abstracted as a deduction task: determine whether a sentence, assumed to capture the situation at hand, is logically implied by the knowledge base. In all cases, the emphasis of this approach is on comprehensibility 17, 20] : knowledge should be encoded so that it is readily accessible.
It is widely agreed today that a large part of our everyday reasoning involves arriving at conclusions that are not entailed by our \theory" of the world. Many conclusions are derived in the absence of information that is su cient to imply them. This type of reasoning is naturally non-monotonic since further evidence may force us to revise our conclusions. Within the knowledge-based systems approach this situation is handled by theories for reasoning with \defaults" (see e.g. 22] ). The true knowledge about the world is augmented by a set of default rules that capture \typical" cases. The quest is for a reasoning system that, given a query, responds in a way that agrees with what we know about the world and (some of) the default assumptions, and at the same time supports our intuition about a plausible conclusion.
Computational considerations, however, render this self-contained approach to reasoning inadequate for commonsense reasoning. This is true not only for the task of deduction, but also for many other forms of reasoning which have been developed. All those were shown to be even harder to compute than the original formulation 27, 24] . Of particular interest in this context are the results on default reasoning tasks 28, 8, 19] , where the increase in complexity is clearly at odds with the intuition that reasoning with defaults should somehow reduce the complexity of reasoning. This remains true, even when we severely restrict the expressivity of the knowledge base, the default rules and the queries allowed.
An alternative approach to the study of commonsense reasoning is developed in 6, 11] . There, the knowledge base is represented as a set of models (satisfying assignments) of the world rather than a logical formula describing it. It is not hard to motivate a model-based approach to reasoning from a cognitive point of view and indeed, most of the proponents of this approach to reasoning have been cognitive psychologists 4, 5, 13] , who have alluded to the notion of \reasoning from examples" on a qualitative basis. In the AI community this approach can be seen as an example of Levesque's notion of \vivid" reasoning 14, 15] , and is somewhat related to Minsky's frames-theory 18].
Given a model-based representation of the knowledge base KB and a query , the deduction task KB j = can be answered in a straightforward way: Evaluate on all the models in the representation. If you nd a model of KB which does not satisfy , then KB 6 j = , otherwise conclude KB j = . Clearly, if the model-based representation contains all the models of KB this approach yields correct deduction, but representing KB by explicitly holding all the possible models is not plausible. A model-based approach becomes feasible if KB can be replaced by a small model-based representation and still support correct deduction.
The theory of model-based representations developed in 11] (generalizing the theory developed in 6] for the case of Horn expressions) characterizes the propositional languages for which model-based representations support e cient deduction and abduction. It is shown that in many cases in which the deduction and abduction tasks are NP-Hard in the formula-based setting, the modelbased representation is small (polynomial in the number of propositional variables in the domain), and reasoning with it yields correct and e cient reasoning algorithms.
In this paper, we extend the work presented in 11] and present some more computational advantages of reasoning with model-based representations. As a basic computational task we consider the problem of reasoning within a varying context. In real life situations, one normally completes a lot of missing context information when answering queries 14]. We model this situation by augmenting the knowledge we have about the world with context-speci c information. Reasoning within context is therefore a deduction task, where some additional constraining information is added to the knowledge base. We show how to solve this task e ciently using a model-based representation, and characterize several propositional languages that can be used to describe the context information.
We then consider the task of default reasoning. There, given a representation of the world, a set of (sometimes con icting) default rules and an assertion q, one is trying to asses whether q can be concluded \by default" from the available information. We show that default reasoning is a generalization of reasoning within context, in which the reasoner has many context rules, which may be con icting. We provide e cient algorithms for (both credulous and skeptical) default reasoning tasks, for several classes of world knowledge, default rules and queries. In both cases, the modelbased representation is used to e ciently nd possible \extensions" (or: contexts). Then, reasoning within context is used as a subroutine in performing the inference. As in the case of deductive and abductive reasoning 11], we present an e cient default reasoning algorithm for cases where the formula based reasoning is hard. Our results show that knowledge, which is available within a speci c context and in a form of a model-based representation, can be used to reason within this context. Therefore, our treatment of reasoning within context supports the view that an intelligent agent constructs a representation of the world incrementally by pasting together many \narrower" views from di erent contexts. This intuitive idea is formalized in a more general setting in the Learning to Reason framework 10], and is also at the heart of the approach developed in 32, 25] , where a di erent view on dealing with incomplete information is taken. We brie y discuss two results in the learning to reason framework that use model-based representations in order to exploit the relevant information in the reasoning process.
In particular, it has been shown, within the Learning to Reason framework 10, 12] , that modelbased representations that are suitable for the reasoning tasks considered in this paper can be learned e ciently. The model based approach to default reasoning can therefore be incorporated within an inductive setting. The model based representation can be e ciently learned, context speci c default rules can be acquired in various learning processes, and these can be combined to work together in a plausible and e cient way.
Relevance and Model-Based Representations
Our results hinge on the notion of relevance, and model based representations are shown to be useful in capturing relevant information and in allowing to ignore irrelevant information. This paper explores a few aspects of relevance and shows that model-based representations support these in a very natural way.
(1)Reasoning within context. This task captures a natural way to use only the information relevant to the situation when arriving at conclusions. Our algorithm for reasoning within context lters out models which are not relevant to the current context before doing the actual reasoning. This ltering process can be performed as a background process whenever the context changes, thereby speeding up the response time of the system. The ltering algorithm relies on the use of model-based representations, which are the main tool in facilitating the computational problem of reasoning within context.
(2)Reasoning with defaults. Somewhat surprisingly, in contrast to their intuitive meaning, default rules do not express explicitly what the relevant context information is, but rather capture all plausible scenarios. In fact, this is the source of additional hardness found for default logic.
As we show, model-based representations help in escaping this hardness by capturing all possible extensions in an accessible form, thereby supporting e cient default reasoning whenever possible. The role of model-based representation, in this framework, can be seen in capturing all \relevant scenarios" as de ned by the default theory.
(3)Learning to Reason. The approach suggested above supports an incremental view of reasoning. It is shown that an intelligent agent can construct its view of the world incrementally by pasting together many \narrower" views from di erent contexts. This is made more formal, and the relation to the notion of relevance more explicit, within the Learning to Reason framework.
When learning to reason one can collect information which is relevant to the learning environment. This information can be used when reasoning, later on, in the same environment. Our discussion shows that model-based representations play an important role in capturing the relevant information during the learning stage and in this way support e cient reasoning.
All these aspects of relevance are based on a model-based approach to reasoning, and can be interwoven to work together, contributing to the understanding of the relation between relevance and tractability in inference.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce some de nitions and the notation used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we brie y present some results from the theory of reasoning with models. In Section 4 we discuss the task of reasoning within context and present an e cient model-based algorithm for it. In Section 5 we discuss default reasoning with models and an application to diagnosis. In Section 6 we brie y present the Learning to Reason framework, and discuss results on learning to reason in which the relevant information is held in the form of a model based representation. At the end of every technical section we also discuss the notion of relevance as manifests itself in the section.
Preliminaries
We consider problems of reasoning where the \world" is modeled as a Boolean function W : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g. We use interchangeably the terms propositional expression and Boolean function, and likewise for propositional language and a class of Boolean functions. We denote classes of Boolean functions by F, G, and functions by f; g. Let An assignment x 2 f0; 1g n satis es f if f(x) = 1. (x is also called a model of f.) If f is a theory of the \world", a satisfying assignment of f is sometimes called a possible world. By \f implies g", denoted f j = g, we mean that every model of f is also a model of g. Throughout the paper, when no confusion can arise, we identify a Boolean function f with the set of its models, namely f ?1 (1) . Observe that the connective \implies" (j =) used between Boolean functions is equivalent to the connective \subset or equal" ( ) used for subsets of f0; 1g n . That is, f j = g if and only if f g.
Reasoning with Models
Consider a propositional knowledge base W and let be a propositional query. The model based strategy, for the deduction problem W j = , is to try and verify the implication relation using model evaluation. Figure 1 describes the algorithm MBR, which uses a set of models ? as a knowledge base. When presented with a query the algorithm evaluates all the models in ?. If a counterexample x such that (x) = 0 is found, then the algorithm returns \No". Otherwise it returns \Yes". Clearly, the model based approach solves the inference problem if ? is the set of all models (satisfying assignments) of W. However, the set of all models might be too large, making this procedure infeasible computationally. A model-based approach becomes useful if one can show that it is possible to use a fairly small set of models as the Test Set, and still perform reasonably good inference.
In the rest of this section we describe general conditions under which this can indeed be done. This section brie y introduces the monotone theory of Boolean functions 3], and the theory of reasoning with models The importance of these de nitions is that every Boolean function has a basis B, and can be represented as follows:
This representation yields a necessary and su cient condition describing when x 2 f0; 1g Horn formulas: The basis for this class is B H = fu 2 f0; 1g n j weight(u) n ? 1g, since every Horn clause is falsi ed by an assignment in B H . Clearly, jB H j = n + 1.
k-quasi-Horn formulas: B H k = fu 2 f0; 1g n j weight(u) n ? kg is a basis for this class. The following theorems are the basic result of the theory of reasoning with models, its application to common queries, and a bound on the size of the model-based representation. In this section we explore some other advantages of using model-based representations. We rst consider the notion of \reasoning within context" and observe that in many respects a compact model-based representation behaves like the complete set of models of a theory. As discussed bellow, reasoning within context captures our intuition of using information which is relevant to the situation at hand. It has been argued that in real life situations, one normally completes a lot of missing \context" information when answering queries 14]. For example, if asked at a conference how long it takes to drive to the airport, we would probably assume (unless speci ed otherwise) that the question refers to the city in which the conference is held, rather than to the place where we live (and have been to the airport more times). This corresponds to assigning the value \true" to the attribute \here" for the purpose of answering the question. Sometimes we need a more expressive language to describe our assumptions regarding the current context and assume, say, that some rule applies 28]. For example, we may assume (in the \conference" context) that if someone has a car, then it is a rental car.
Let W be a Boolean function that describes our knowledge about the world. A \ rst principle" way to formalize the above intuition is the following: we want to deduce a query from W, if can be inferred from W given that the query refers to the current context. Namely, the instances of W which are relevant to the query must also satisfy the context condition d, a conjunction of some literals and rules. We denote this question by W j = d .
Notice that it is possible that W j = d but W 6 j = , if all the satisfying assignments of W that do not satisfy do not satisfy d. Formalized this way, the problem W j = d is equivalent to the problem W^d j = . Thus, a theorem proving approach to reasoning does not provide any computational advantage in solving this reasoning problem. Let W 2 F, 2 G and let B be a basis for G. From Theorem 3.2 it is clear that given ? B W^d , the set of characteristic models for W^d, model-based reasoning can be used to solve the reasoning problem W^d j = . However, we consider here a more general problem: given ? d is a CNF expression with at most log n clauses, and therefore can be written as a DNF expression in which every term has at most logn literals. Therefore (t i _ c j ) has at most 2 log n literals.
Finally, notice that we do not need to get d as a DNF expression. The analysis uses this expression to show that d ! belongs to the desired class, but the algorithm evaluates d and directly, using the representation given to it and the ltering algorithm.
It is interesting to note that the size of the expression for d ! described in the above proof might be exponentially large. However, it appears only in the analysis. We do not actually compute this expression in the algorithm. Rather, ltering examples according to d is su cient.
The approach presented in this section can be viewed as a process of augmenting a model-based representation ? with a set of rules. Given a model-based representation ? B W of W, any rule that holds in W cannot help in answering queries, since it does not lter out any assignment of W, and is thus redundant. However, the context rules do not hold in W and thus augmenting W with them modi es the set of conclusions. As we have shown, in order to reason within context, we need to maintain a model-based representation with respect to a basis that is slightly larger than the basis in the pure deductive case.
Context and Relevance
Our treatment of context information appeals to the intuitive notion of relevance. The algorithm C-MBR uses the context information d to lter out the irrelevant information in its knowledge base.
The irrelevant information in this case is the set of models that do not correspond to the current context. The use of a model based representation facilitates e cient ltering, since it only requires evaluating the current context on the elements of the representation. A natural approach for a real agent would be to perform the ltering algorithm in the background, whenever the context changes. This way, the reasoning itself will be faster since at any time only evaluation on the models of the current context is required.
This should be contrasted with a formula based representation, where adding context information does not necessarily help the computational task. There, the formula d is conjuncted with the formula W, and theorem proving is used. Since W^d is not necessarily simpler to reason with than W, the task, in general, does not become easier.
Default Reasoning with Models
In the previous section we assumed that the context information is given. In general, one might have many context rules, which may be con icting, and the goal is to derive plausible conclusions in the face of this information. This is the situation modeled in default reasoning. Given a representation of the world, a set of (sometimes con icting) default rules, and an assertion q, one is trying to asses whether q can be concluded \by default" from the available information. We show that this is a generalization of reasoning within context, and that it can also be dealt with e ciently using model-based representations.
We shall concentrate here on a special case of Reiter's Default logic 21], applied to propositional logic and with some restrictions on the default rules. Notice that the theory for diagnosis 23] and the closed world defaults 21] can be described using simple defaults.
A default theory is a pair (D; W) where D is a set of default rules, and W is propositional expression. An extension of (D; W) is de ned using a xed point operator. For our special case the following theorem gives an alternative and simpler de nition: (The operator Th(R) denotes the theorem closure of R.) Theorem 5.1 ( 23] , page 88) Let D be a set of normal defaults with empty prerequisites. E is an extension of (D; W) if and only if E = Th(W^S), and S is a maximal subset of D such that W^S is consistent.
Using this theorem as the de nition for extension we can identify a maximal consistent subset S with each extension E. We denote this subset by S E . Since S E is consistent with W, we get that an extension E includes q if and only if W^S E j = q. Given the de nition of extensions, two forms of default reasoning are usually de ned. The credulous default reasoning task CDEF(D; W; q) is de ned as follows: given a default theory (D; W) and a propositional expression q, decide whether there exists an extension E of (D; W) such that q 2 E. The skeptical default reasoning task SDEF(D; W; q) is de ned as follows: given a default theory (D; W) and a propositional expression q, decide whether for all the extensions E of (D; W), q 2 E.
Clearly, if W is consistent with the set of all rules in D, then there is only one maximal consistent subset S of D, the one which contains all these rules. In this case both credulous and skeptical default reasoning reduce to reasoning within the context D, as discussed earlier. The main di culty which arises in the general case is that W may not be consistent with all of D.
Next we present positive results on default reasoning using a model-based representation. As in the case of deductive and abductive reasoning 11], the e cient results we present hold in cases where the formula based reasoning is hard 
Credulous Default Reasoning
We start by describing the algorithm CD-MBR, which is presented in Figure 3 . Let ? = ? W be a model based representation of W. (The monotone basis will be de ned later.) The algorithm CD-MBR receives ?; D and a query q as input. It starts by enumerating all the models in ?. When it nds a model z in which the query holds (i.e., q(z) = 1), it sets S to be the set of all the rules in D that this model satis es. The algorithm then tests whether W^S j = q by calling the procedure C-MBR to decide whether W j = S q. If the answer is \Yes" the algorithm returns \Yes" and otherwise it continues to test the next model in ?. If all the models in ? have been scanned and no good extension has been found the algorithm says \No".
Assume the algorithm is run with a model-based representation ? = ? Proof: We need to prove that (i) if the algorithm returns \Yes" then the desired extension exists, and (ii) that if there is an extension that contains q, then the algorithm returns \Yes".
For (i), since Condition 5.2 holds, Theorem 4.1 implies that C-MBR is correct, that is, W^S j = q. By construction, S is a subset of D for which W^S is consistent. This implies that there is a set S S which is a maximal consistent subset of D, namely an extension, for which W^S j = q.
For (ii), assume that there is an extension E that contains q. By de nition, the existence of E implies that there exists a subset S E D such that W^S E is consistent and, W^S E j = q. Thus, there is an assignment u 2 W such that S E (u) = 1 and therefore also q(u) = 1.
Condition 5.3 implies that there exist a prime implicant t of S E and a basis element b 2 B such that S E (u) = t(u) = t(b) = 1. Thus, u, and b agree on all the literals that appear in t, and therefore for all z such that z b u, t(z) = S E (z) = 1. This implies, by selecting w 2 min b (W), that there is a model w 2 ? B W such that S E (w) = 1, and since W^S E j = q also q(w) = 1. Now, consider the set S that the algorithm CD-MBR uses in the iteration for w. By construction, the algorithm will compute a set which is identical to S E . The answer returned by C-MBR is correct, due to Condition 5.2 and Theorem 4.1. This shows that the algorithm correctly responds \Yes".
The following lemmas identify cases in which the required conditions hold. In particular, if D contains up to l negative literals, so does every subset of it S, and the basis B H l su ces. For (iii), every subset S D has a CNF expression with at most log n clauses, and therefore also a DNF expression in which every term has at most log n literals. Therefore, if u satis es S, u also satis es a prime implicant t with no more than log n literals. Thus, if the monotone basis B contains an (n; k) universal set, Condition 5.3 holds, since t must satisfy at least one of the elements there. 
Skeptical Default Reasoning
The only di erence between the credulous and the skeptical reasoning tasks is that in the latter we respond a rmatively only if the query holds in all extensions rather than just in one. A legitimate extension is a maximal subset of the set D of default rules. For credulous default reasoning it was su cient to guarantee that all the maximal sets are considered as candidates, and it was not important that some non-maximal sets were considered as well (since they could not change the answer of the algorithm). For skeptical reasoning, we need to identify the maximal sets, since a consistent subset S which is not maximal might satisfy W^S 6 j = q while every maximal subset S E which includes S satis es W^S E j = q. Therefore, the rst stage of the algorithm SD-MBR, presented in Figure 4 , tests for maximal subsets.
Let ? = ? W be a model based representation of W. The algorithm SD-MBR receives ?; D and a query q as input. It starts by enumerating all the models in ?. When it nds a model z in which the query holds (i.e., q(z) = 1), it sets S to be the set of all the rules in D that this model satis es. The algorithm then tests whether S is indeed a maximal consistent subset, by checking whether there is any superset of S that is consistent with W. (In the correctness proof of the algorithm we show that it is su cient to test this condition using elements of ?.) If S is not maximal then it is ignored and the algorithm goes on to the next assignment in ?. Otherwise, the algorithm then tests whether W^S j = q by calling the procedure C-MBR to decide whether W j = S q. If the answer is \No" the algorithm returns \No", and otherwise it continues to look for another maximal set S. If all the models in ?, and the corresponding subsets of D, have been scanned and no bad extension has been found the algorithm says \Yes". Proof: The proof is identical to that of Theorem 5.4, with the exception that we need to show that the subsets S identi ed as extensions (i.e., agged max after the inner loop) include all, and exactly all the extensions.
The proof of Theorem 5.4 shows that every extension S is indeed considered, for some z 2 ?. Since an extension S is maximal, it passes the inner loop test in SD-MBR. That is, no superset of S which is consistent with W is found. Therefore all extensions are passed to the subroutine for C-MBR, which gives a correct answer.
We have to verify though that if the algorithm claims that S is maximal then it is indeed maximal. Assume that S is not maximal and that for some d, S = S^d is consistent with W. Consider the iteration in the algorithm in which d is the candidate added to S. Since S is consistent with W we know that there is some u 2 W such that S (u) = 1. But, Condition 5.3 holds for S as well, and therefore there is a y 2 ? which satis es S . Thus, the algorithm will detect this fact, set S f lag = no-max, and ignore S as required. 
Application: Diagnosis using Models
One of the useful applications of default logic is for the problem of circuit diagnosis 23]. Consider for example the circuit d a^b; e d _ c, composed of one and gate and one or gate. In order to diagnose possible problems in the circuit we add, for every gate, a new variable denoting that it is operating normally. In our example N 1 will correspond to the and gate and N 2 will correspond to the or gate. Using these new variables, the functionality of the circuit can be described by Under normal conditions we want to assume that all the gates are operating normally. This is captured in our example by the set of positive simple default rules D = fN 1 =N 1 ; N 2 =N 2 g, and in general by having one rule for each gate's \normality" variable.
In the absence of any further evidence, considering the default problem (W; D) reveals that there is only one extension, D. This should be interpreted as stating that all the gates are operating normally.
Suppose, however, that we observe that c = 1 and e = 0. In such a case the circuit can be described as W 0 = W^c e, and we need to consider the default reasoning problem (W 0 ; D). It is easy to see that in this case there is only one extension which includes N 1 but does not include N 2 .
This should be interpreted as stating that a minimal explanation for the fault is that gate number 2 is faulty.
Of course, it is not always the case that observations exactly determine the fault in the circuit. We now show how to apply our positive results for default reasoning to the problem of diagnosis. Observe that in the problem of diagnosis our knowledge about the world varies with the observations. Therefore the observations serve as a kind of context information. On top of that we have to support the default rules that capture the assumptions on the normality of the gates.
This suggests the algorithm Diag-MBR, described in Figure 5 . The algorithm rst uses ltering as in C-MBR, where the observations O serve as the context information. Then it uses the set of ltered models as the knowledge base for the algorithm SD-MBR.
As the following theorem shows, for the strategy to succeed it is su cient that the expression (O ! (S ! q)) is supported as a query by the characteristic models. Proof: Given the set of observation O, the requirement is to solve the default task SDEF(D; (WÔ ); q). As in Thereon 5.8 we need to show that all extension are considered by the algorithm, and that the subroutine for reasoning within context is used properly.
Let S E be an extension of W^O. Namely, there is a model u 2 W^O^S E . Since S E is a subset of D it includes only positive literals. Also, by the conditions of the theorem, O has at most l literals (and therefore at most l negative literals). This implies that B H k+l includes an assignment b which agrees with both O and S E on all literals. Thus, there is an assignment z 2 ?, z b u such that z agrees with b and u on all the literals in S E and O. The assignment z will survive the ltering stage of the algorithm, and the extension S E will be properly identi ed. When an extension S is identi ed by the algorithm SD-MBR, it uses a subroutine call to C-MBR to test whether the question q follows given the context S. In our case, the question is whether (W^O) j = S q which is equivalent to W^O^S j = q. Using Theorem 4.1 we get that this is answered correctly as long as B is a basis for O _ S _ q. Since S is monotone, and O has at most l literals this holds in our case.
Default Logic and Relevance
Using defaults in reasoning is motivated by the desire to allow for e cient decision-making in the presence of incomplete information. The goal is to exploit the information given with respect to \typical" cases, namely, the default rules, when it is relevant to the current situation. Moreover, this process of identifying the relevant cases should, intuitively, contribute somehow to reducing the complexity of reasoning.
However, it turns out that when using default logic as the default reasoning framework, this goal is missed. While each rule in the representation constitutes a local assumption, a set of default rules tries to capture all plausible scenarios. The default reasoning task is de ned in relation to all of the scenarios, where each scenario, or extension, can be thought of as a possible context the agent might be in. In fact, the computational di culties in default logic can be traced to this search for possible scenarios.
As we have shown, using model based representations allows us to present a more natural view of default reasoning, and thus highlight its tight relation to the notion of relevance in reasoning. Under certain restrictions, model based representations capture all possible scenarios in an accessible form, and a simple algorithm can use the ltering technique in order to focus on the information in each of these contexts and reason with respect to this context information.
Learning to Reason
The results presented so far in previous sections support an incremental view of reasoning in a natural way. In this section we discuss the issue of relevance as manifested in the learning to reason framework.
We have shown that a model-based representation can be used to reason correctly when some additional constraining context information is supplied. This information augments the agents' knowledge and aids in deriving conclusions relevant to this context. We call this a top-down solution, since it is assumes that the agent has a complete knowledge base, but uses only parts of it, depending on the current context.
It is conceivable, though, for an agent to have only some of the models, those models that come from some speci c context d. In such a case, our results show that the agent reasons correctly within this context (although not within every context). We call this a bottom-up approach. This approach supports the view that an intelligent agent constructs a representation of the world incrementally by pasting together many \narrower" views from di erent contexts. In each of those the agent is guaranteed to reason correctly and, eventually, it constructs a more complete knowledge base, which supports many possible contexts, even those never experienced.
This intuitive approach can be cast in a more general framework which emphasizes the inductive nature of reasoning. In particular, the framework allows for a formal study of the intuitive notion of \relevance to the environment". Namely, the performance of an agent has to be measured by some criterion that depends on the world the agent functions in.
In systems that learn, the world in which the performance criterion is applied is the same world that supplies the agent with the information for learning. This intuition is captured in the distribution free model of learning theory 31]. There, an agent rst wanders around in the world, observing examples drawn from some unknown distribution D which governs the occurrences of instances in the world. Then, the agent has to perform its task, namely to classify instances. The agent is allowed to err on some set of instances as long as the measure of this set under D is small. Thus, the same arbitrary \world" that supplies the information in the learning phase is used to measure the agent's performance later. This intuition was not captured by early formulations of reasoning, where the agent has an exact formula-based description of the world (traditionally, a CNF formula), and its performance is de ned in some way that does not depend on the world it functions in (e.g., the ability to make arbitrary deductions).
In 10] a general framework, learning to reason, is de ned, that incorporates the ideas above into the study of reasoning. In this framework the intelligent agent is given access to its favorite learning interface, and is also given a grace period in which it can interact with this interface and construct its representation 5 KB of the world W. The reasoning performance is measured only after this period, when the agent is presented with queries from some query language, relevant to the world, and has to answer whether W implies .
It is shown that through this interaction with the world, the agent truly gains additional reasoning power. We brie y describe two results which emphasize how this framework supports the use of the relevant information. As before, these results rely on using model based representations.
A Sampling Approach
Suppose we have access to random examples from a certain context d in our world W (e.g., the \conference" context discussed above). This may allow us to take random samples from the assignments in W^d. It Notice that this is very similar to the usage of model based representations in the framework for reasoning within context. Now, instead of having a xed and well de ned set of models, which supports exact reasoning, a random set is used (and we require only probably-approximately-correct reasoning).
Theory Approximation and Restricted Queries
The view we take on commonsense reasoning is that the world the agent has to function in is very complex, but the agent is supposed to perform well on a fairly wide, but restricted, class of tasks. The question arises then, whether the agent needs a complete description of the world, or whether some partial information, relevant to the task, is su cient.
In 11] it is shown that in some cases partial information su ces. Consider the deduction problem, and suppose that our agent were to wander in a world in which all queries are restricted in some form, or belong to some language Q. This means that the agent needs to answer correctly only queries in Q, and may (potentially) be wrong on queries not in Q, as it is not going to be queried on those anyway.
It is shown there, that an incomplete description of the world, in particular, its least upper bound representation, is su cient to answer these queries. Intuitively, these approximation (de ned in 7, 29] ) captures all the conclusions of W which belong to Q. In 11] it is shown that these support exact deduction with respect queries in Q. In 10] it is shown that while exact learning of functions is still not within reach, one can learn theory approximations for functions (and in particular, the least upper bound representations mentioned above). This holds, for example, for the approximation with respect to all common expressions. Therefore, one can learn such knowledge approximations though interaction with the world, and then use the approximation in order to reason on any common expression.
Notice, though, that it is important that the output of the learning phase is presented in a form that is amenable to e cient solutions for the reasoning task. For example, suppose the task is answering log n CNF queries, and suppose that we can learn an exact representation of the least upper bound of W with respect to log n-CNF. In such a case it is NP-hard to reason with this representation and therefore not feasible. Our result is made possible by using a model-based representation of this least upper bound, which enables us to perform the reasoning e ciently.
Conclusions
Reasoning with models is an intuitive paradigm, which has been shown to be theoretically sound. In this paper we presented more evidence to the utility of such representations. In particular, these representations support e cient reasoning in the presence of varying context information, as well as restricted cases of default reasoning.
The basic computational task we considered is the problem of reasoning within a varying context. We modeled this situation by augmenting the knowledge we have about the world with context-speci c information, and showed how to solve this task e ciently using a model-based representation.
In default reasoning, an agent may have many (possibly con icting) default rules, acquired in di erent contexts. Default reasoning is thus a generalization of reasoning within context where the additional information may not be consistent, and may not be consistent with the knowledge the agent has about the world. Indeed, a query holds \by default", if there is a plausible context in which it holds.
We have shown that under certain restrictions, model based representations capture all possible scenarios in an accessible form. Thus, when using model-based representation, default reasoning can be also treated computationally as a natural generalization of reasoning within context, and therefore be solved e ciently.
The signi cance of these results is that they are achieved as natural extensions of exact (deductive) reasoning, and hold in cases in which the traditional formula-based representation does not support e cient reasoning.
Moreover, we have shown that these results support an incremental view of reasoning in a natural way, and discussed the Learning to Reason framework and the notion of relevance as manifested in it. In particular, within this framework it has been shown that the model based representations discussed here can be learned e ciently. This can be combined with context speci c default rules that are acquired via rote learning or other learning processes 26] to work in a plausible way.
These results can be viewed as providing some theoretical support for the usefulness of casebased style reasoning, where a set of \typical cases" is used as a knowledge representation. More work is needed to investigate other reasoning tasks and model-based representations, in order to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of these issues.
An important goal of this paper was to show that with model-based representation one can exploit various aspects of relevance. We believe that an e ective use of the relevant information is an essential part of a satisfactory modeling of an inference task. In this respect, model-based representations serve as a good example, since we have explored various aspects of relevance and showed that model-based representations support all of those in a natural way.
